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Managing quality risk in supply chain to drive firm's 
performance: the roles of control mechanisms 
 
ABSTRACT 
Product harm scandal can be viewed as a company’s nightmare. In many cases, the source of 
defective or unsafe components may not be the manufacturing firm itself; rather, there may be 
problems inherent in the supply network. This research aims to investigate the effects of two 
focused risk management practices, namely supplier development and proactive product recall, on 
firms’ performance. To scrutinise the impact of two types of control mechanisms, we investigate 
social control and formal control as antecedents of risk management practices, and explore their 
moderating roles on the relationship between risk management practices and firm performance. 
Based on the survey-based data obtained from 209 Chinese manufacturers, structural equation 
modelling and hierarchical regression are used to test the proposed hypotheses. The results show 
that both supplier development and proactive product recall significantly contribute to financial 
performance and quality performance. Furthermore, both formal control and social control are the 
significant antecedents of the two risk management practices. Most importantly, we examine the 
moderating roles of the control mechanisms on the relationship between the risk management 
practices and firm performance. Practitioners should be aware that the control mechanisms have 
different moderating effects, i.e. different type of control mechanism should be employed to 
facilitate the risk management practices in order to achieve a better firm performance.  
Keywords: Risk Management; Supplier Development; Product Recall Management; Formal 
Control; Social Control 
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1. Introduction 
The largest scale of product recall in mobile phone industry, i.e. Samsung Galaxy Note 7 
crisis, has put a spotlight on quality control of electronics production. The recall crisis is 
also raising questions about how today’s manufacturing company could prevent the quality 
problem raised in their supply chain, and maybe more importantly, how could they prepare 
if the product quality happened. The product quality problem is a current issue but an old 
problem. From 2006 until the end of 2015, the number of product recall cases in the EU 
rose rapidly, by 203%1. Scholars and practitioners claim that among the major reasons for 
this rapid increase are the extent of global sourcing of materials and the magnitude of the 
outsourcing production of branded products to contract manufacturers (Roth et al. 2008). 
The lengthening of the global supply chain increases uncertainty and adds extra quality 
considerations to the final products. Since many firms have moved their production 
offshore, it becomes more difficult to assure the quality and safety of their products (Tse 
et al. 2011).  
The impact of quality risk is felt across diverse industries. However, not all product recalls 
originate from poor manufacturing processes; rather, they are associated with irresponsible 
purchasing on the part of the firms.  In other words, quality risk is inherent in the supply 
network (Tse and Zhang 2017). Knowing how to handle quality risks through proper risk 
management practices is crucial for firms if they are to survive and compete in the market, 
and particularly, to prevent defective or unsafe products from reaching the customer 
(Chavez and Seow 2012). Thus, practitioners face the challenging question: What practices 
are appropriate to manage and control the risks to product quality in the global supply chain? 
However, the literature provides only a limited understanding of which risk management 
practices can help to mitigate the negative consequences of quality risks and improve firms’ 
performance, or what mechanisms can impact on the risk management practices (Hora et 
al. 2011; Tse et al. 2011). Conceptually, some theoretical perspectives are available to 
inform scholars and practitioners on how to manage supply chain risk effectively. 
Empirically, there is limited research on how risk management facilitates firm performance, 
or what important antecedents influence these risk management practices.  
                                                 
1
 Data are available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumers_safety/safety_products/rapex/alerts/main/index.cfm?event=main.
search 
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In this research, two kinds of risk management practices are investigated: proactive product 
recall (PPR) and supplier development (SD). PPR is a responsive practice to manage 
quality risk, which, when used appropriately, can mitigate the negative impact on the firm. 
It is a remedy action; i.e., one that takes place after risk has actually happened (Thun and 
Hoenig 2011). However, the quality risk should also be addressed before the 
defective/contaminated materials enter the firm, to effectively reduce the negative impact 
in the long term. For this purpose, the SD approach may be appropriate, since quality 
assurance of supplier products is an agency problem (Zu and Kaynak 2012). SD can be 
viewed as a preventive risk management practice to protect against quality risk from the 
upstream network, by minimising the likelihood of defective materials entering the firm. 
Furthermore, SD has been widely regarded as an important practice that foster quality 
performance (Salimian et al. 2017).    
Moreover, the effects of the risk management practices on firm performance might 
represent a complex pattern and require a contingency perspective for investigation 
(Ritchie and Brindley 2007). This study adds to the literature by investigating the 
antecedent and moderating roles of two control mechanism, namely social control and 
formal control (Liu et al. 2017). While considerable attention has been paid to these control 
mechanisms by the business research, the supply chain risk management (SCRM) literature 
surprisingly did not integrate with this insight. The adoption of two control mechanism 
brings benefits as well as limitations to a company. Formal control is a control mechanism 
that focusing on using the explicit contract to specify the responsibilities and obligations 
of each party (Rhee et al. 2014); yet the contract is not always completed and literature 
argue that formal control might hinder the strategic flexibility (Lumineau 2015). In contrast, 
relying on shared norms and trust with the business partners, social control may provide 
more flexibility to a company and may reduce more transactional costs (Dong et al. 2017). 
This research extends the previous research by investigative the different roles of two 
control mechanisms in the context of SCRM. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to build and test a model guided by theory related 
to quality risk management, and to offer a comprehensive picture of the mechanism of 
inter-organisational control in risk management. The model aims to: (i) evaluate the PPR 
and SD impact on firm performance; (ii) test the inter-organisational control antecedents 
of PPR and SD; and (iii) examine the moderating roles of the inter-organisational control 
mechanism in the relationship between risk management practices and firm performance.  
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 comprises a review of the risk 
management literature. In Section 3, we describe the theoretical underpinnings of our 
research, the research model, and the hypotheses. Section 4 reports the data-gathering 
procedures and the operationalisation of the construct in this research. Then, in Section 5, 
the model of risk management, its control antecedents and moderation effect are tested 
using structural equations modelling (SEM) and multiple linear regression.  The results are 
discussed in Section 6. Finally, we summarise the implications of our work for both 
research and practice. 
 
2. Literature and Theoretical Development  
Central to the proposed model is the notion that risk management has an impact on both 
financial performance (FP) and quality performance (QP). Our conceptualisation of risk 
management includes the preventive and reactive practices aimed at managing the potential 
quality risk in the upstream supply chain and reducing the negative consequences of 
product recall in the downstream network. In order to coordinate the activities of risk 
management practices, managers also need to utilise control mechanisms. Therefore, we 
include two control mechanisms as the antecedents of both SD and PPR. To understand 
the whole picture of control mechanisms, we also investigate their moderating role in the 
relationship between the risk management practices and the firm’s performance. The 
conceptual model is presented in Figure 1.  
……………………………………………………………….. 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
2.1 Quality Risk management and Firm Performance 
In order to properly manage the quality risk, the firm needs to consider both the upstream 
and downstream supply chain. In the upstream supply chain, the firm needs to create a 
responsible purchasing approach to block the source of the defective material. This 
involves preventive actions to stop the risk from happening (ex-ante action). In the 
downstream supply chain, the firm needs to take prompt and responsive action when they 
discover a potential product harm crisis (ex-post action). Thun and Hoenig (2011) state 
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that a comprehensive SCRM plan should include both preventive and reactive action. 
Similarly, Lewis (2003) categorises the ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms as important 
elements in operational risk management control. The ex-ante activities are viewed as a 
preventive action that is similar to the quality management notion of ‘right first time’ and 
error-proofing. The ex-post mechanism addresses the management of negative 
consequences, just as service quality actively considers recovery from quality failure. In 
this research, we investigate SD as the ex-ante action and PPR as the ex-post action. Figure 
1 illustrates how both risk management practices are adopted in order to mitigate the 
quality risk in the upstream and downstream supply chain.  
Within the operations management literature, there is extensive research about the adoption 
of management practices to deal with risk. Most of the researchers in this field discuss how 
their proposed frameworks can reduce the probability and the impact of risk (Ritchie and 
Brindley 2007; Ho et al. 2009; Ho et al. 2010; Thun and Müller 2010). However, these 
studies do not focus on quality risk in the supply chain, and are limited to investigating the 
impact of the product recall management on brand equity (Dawar and Pillutla 2000), on 
stock market reaction (Zhao et al. 2009), or on marketing effectiveness (Van Heerde et al. 
2007). Gray et al. (2011) investigate the quality risk in offshore manufacturing plants and 
find that the effect of plant location, geographic distance, and the skill level of workers can 
affect supply chain quality risk. Hora et al. (2011) robustly examine the product recall 
pattern in a case when quality risk triggered a destructive product recall in the toy industry. 
Their study enhances the understanding of the nature of different recall strategies and the 
best time to trigger the recall. Although there have been numerous studies related to product 
harm crisis presented in recent years, the research is still limited to the reactive activities 
after the product harm crisis has occurred (i.e. product recall management).  
……………………………………………………………….. 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
SD, which can be regarded as a preventive risk management approach, refers to the efforts 
made by the focal company to build up suppliers’ capability and performance (Krause 
1999). Krause and Ellram (1996) argue that firms should ensure their suppliers’ 
performance in terms of quality, cost, delivery and financial health improvement. In SD, 
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the firm wishes to maintain a long-term relationship with reliable and capable suppliers to 
ensure the provision of quality components. Both the buyer firm and the suppliers 
contribute to the overall quality of the products, and collaborate in several activities to 
improve product quality (Salimian et al. 2017). Therefore, the buyer firm’s managers need 
to make decisions about investing in suppliers’ facilities in order to improve the product 
quality. Furthermore, the buyer firm needs to invest in education and training to build the 
suppliers’ abilities to ensure product quality and safety (Krause et al. 2007). These 
activities are instigated by the purchasing firm in order to help SD regarding quality 
performance (QP) and capability (Zsidisin and Ellram 2003).  
From the perspective of agency theory, SD is a behaviour-based practice. Such practice is 
concerned with process, tasks and activities that lead to risk reduction (Harland et al. 2003), 
and represents a suitable strategy when the supplier’s uncertainty factor becomes 
significant (Zsidisin and Ellram (2003). Task programmability refers to the degree to which 
appropriate behaviour by the agent can be specified in advance, and provides an easy way 
to measure behaviour (Eisenhardt 1989). When a firm engages in SD, helping a supplier to 
develop their capability in quality and closely monitoring their operation, a template of 
activities can be defined and approved by both buyer and seller firms (Zirpoli and Caputo 
2002; Zsidisin and Smith 2005). In other words, the activities of SD could engender high 
task programmability for the supplier. Generally, the more programmable the supplier’s 
task, the easier it becomes for the buyer firm to control the supplier’s behaviour. One of 
the aims of creating task programmability is to reduce the target cost (Zsidisin and Ellram 
2003; Zsidisin and Smith 2005). To do this, the process begins with a breakdown of 
allowable supplier costs. The buyer firm can provide a target cost for the supplier to aim 
at, while the supplier can suggest possible changes in the task or even in the design in order 
to reach the predetermined target cost. When the buyer firm creates task programmability 
by implementing SD, the target cost saving is shared with the supplier. Therefore, SD can 
contribute to achieving a lower price and thus help the firm to remain competitive in the 
industry.    
Moreover, the SD actions have the benefit of consolidating the idiosyncratic interaction 
routines that help supply chain partners to realise each other’s strengths and weaknesses 
(Ross et al. 2009). Such consensus between the focal firm and suppliers can contribute to 
improving the capability to respond to uncertainties, and help the firm to remain 
competitive in the industry (Foerstl et al. 2010). Li et al. (2012) indicates that the supplier 
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development plans that focusing on close collaboration relationship with the suppliers can 
significantly improve the quality performance and consequently enhance the competitive 
advantage of the buying firm. Also, Pulles et al. (2014) suggest that the SD program can 
significantly lead supplier contribute to buyer’s innovation. 
Previous empirical studies provide significant evidence to demonstrate the positive effect 
of SD on both a buyer’s product quality and FP (Carr and Kaynak 2007; Al-Tit 2017). For 
example, when the buyer firm helps the supplier to build up its quality capability, the buyer 
gains a better understanding of the supplier’s weaknesses in the production line; hence the 
waste generated in each procedure and the quality variance in each task is more likely to 
be investigated. Thus, it is easier for both parties to be alerted to possible ways of improving 
the component and of cutting the cost during production (Zirpoli and Caputo 2002; Carr 
and Kaynak 2007). In addition, Wagner and Johnson (2004) indicate that as a critical 
element of the strategic supplier portfolios, SD enable focal company to create competitive 
advantage.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 1. SD has a positive effect on QP. 
Hypothesis 2. SD has a positive effect on FP. 
Proactively recalling the defective product, an effective procedure for returning the product, 
and replacing the product are claimed as the most appropriate steps to manage a quality 
crisis when it has already occurred (Kumar and Budin 2006). Liu et al. (2016) indicates 
companies should put emphasis on a more proactive product recall (i.e. full remedy) to 
obtain long-term benefit of the customer satisfaction and trust. A proper product recall 
strategy should certainly improve the effectiveness of the return process. Although there 
are no ‘hard and fast’ rules for preparing for a product recall/withdrawal that can cover 
every circumstance, a predefined plan can provide some guidelines as to how different 
parties in a supply chain should act and manage the unsafe/defective products (BRC 2007). 
Better reactive activities can achieve prompt management of problematic products in the 
supply chain. Researchers who hold an opposite view argue that the more proactive product 
recall adopt by the company will lead to worse firm value, because the investor might treat 
the proactive product recall as a signal that the crisis is very serve (Liu et al. 2016). 
However, this study focuses on how a firm prepare for the recall (i.e. remedy planning) 
instead of the immediate action during the crisis.  
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PPR aims to diminish the effect of the incident by ensuring that the buyer will not deliver 
the defective or unsafe products to downstream partners. If the focal firm is alerted to the 
problem early enough, it will be spared a massive recall. For example, if the defective 
products get only as far as the distributor, the firm needs only to withdraw the batch of 
problematic products. In contrast, in the case that the defective products have already been 
parcelled out and delivered to various retailers or end-customers, massive resources must 
be allocated for this product withdrawal. The buyer firm will suffer the high operations 
costs of product recall, which include the costs of contacting customers, logistics, 
compensation, penalties, and even lawsuits (Kumar and Schmitz 2011). Once the defective 
products have passed through one more layer of the downstream supply chain, the number 
of affected parties may increase dramatically. 
From a quality management perspective, PPR can be viewed as corrective action. When 
defects are detected, appropriate measures must be taken to stop them further affecting the 
companies involved. The firm must determine the source of the defect and investigate other 
suspect products that might trigger another withdrawal and recall (BRC 2007). If the defect 
originates from sourced material, the defective component may be included in more than 
one batch of products. Moreover, the firms need to scrutinise the origin of the quality risk 
to prevent the same incident from happening again. It is inefficient for a firm to correct the 
same quality problems more than once (Willians et al. 2006). Also, through thorough 
planning of remedial action, managers can gain better understanding of which types of 
quality problem are most costly and difficult to resolve; that is, the problems that require 
multiple ex-post actions when the buyer delivers the faulty products to downstream parties. 
For example, if a product is contaminated by a toxic substance that contaminated product 
must not be reworked, nor broken down to sub-components for use in another product. 
Indeed, the firm might need to employ special resources for its disposal. If managers have 
prepared in advance for such an eventuality, they can set up an appropriate remedial plan, 
and the firm can pay extra attention to preventing contamination in the materials and final 
products (Kumar and Budin 2006). Thus, the related quality and safety assurance can be 
enhanced by the better planning of risk remedies. Moreover, the implementation of PPR 
may also enhance a firm’s willingness to learn which in turn can improve firm’s 
performance (Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Hu and Flynn 2014). Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 3. PPR has a positive effect on QP.  
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Hypothesis 4. PPR has a positive effect on FP. 
 
2.2 Roles of Inter-organisational control mechanism 
Researchers argue that the success of sourcing activities depends heavily on the 
effectiveness of control mechanisms (Li et al. 2008). Such mechanisms can reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and improve the company’s competitive advantage (Li et al. 2008), 
especially in highly uncertain environments. According to agency theory, one of the 
leading causes of agency problems is the presence of conflicting goals between buyer and 
agent. The appropriate use of control mechanisms can reduce goal incongruence and 
preference divergences among supply chain partners (Li et al. 2008), and so ensure 
responsible purchasing. According to Das and Teng (2001), there are two kinds of control 
mechanism, namely formal control (FC) and social control (SC). FC focuses on utilising 
rules and specified procedures, while SC emphasises mutual benefits and norms (Li et al. 
2008).  
Using the explicit contract to specify the responsibilities and obligations of each party, FC 
can reduce opportunism and safeguard inter-organisational relationships (IORs) (Li et al. 
2010a; Schepker et al. 2014; Cao and Lumineau 2015). Recent research indicates the 
adoption of FC can facilitate company’s capability to leverage the resource to foster 
performance (Wacker et al. 2016). According to Luo (2002), when foreign company 
establish the collaboration with the company in China, they tend to emphasize more on the 
role of FC. Meanwhile, in inter-firm coordination as in all kinds of alliances, there is 
usually a ‘social side’. Here the SC mechanism comes into operation, characterised by 
particular traits such as relying on informal structures and self-enforcement of each party 
in IORs (Dyer and Singh 1998; Cao and Lumineau 2015; Zhang et al. 2017). Differing in 
focus compared to FC, SC requires that the group share values, beliefs and goals so that 
appropriate behaviours can be reinforced and rewarded. According to Gulati and Sytch 
(2007), the relational governance (i.e. SC) can provide company additional relational rents 
in IORs so as to foster procurement performance.  
In compare with the western countries, there are different views of the use of relational ties 
or more impersonal institutions in the emerging economies like China. Given that China 
had experienced a remarkable economic transformation from a centrally planned to a 
market-based economy, coming with increased scope and complexity of the economic 
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transactions, the Chinese companies should rely more on the contractual control 
mechanism (Peng 2003). However, other researchers argue that the relational governance 
will still to be the major way for the Chinese companies to govern the complex transactions, 
because of the traditional culture and the highly uncertain nature of the business 
environment (Zhou et al. 2003). The empirical evidence that informing the issue of IORs 
control mechanism in China are inconsistent and scare (Zhou et al. 2008). Moreover, the 
research that investigating the roles of control mechanisms in SCRM is rarely found in the 
existing studies. To address these research gaps, in the context of China, we examine the 
roles of FC and FC in our joint SCRM practices. We argue that both SC and FC might be 
both the key drivers for firms to achieve effective SCRM and even strengthen the effect of 
SCRM practices on firm performance.   
2.2.1 Impact of control mechanisms on SCRM practices 
In SD, task programmability is an essential element to monitor the supplier’s 
manufacturing process and ensure the quality and safety of the product supplied 
(Madhusudan 2005). Moreover, the buyer firm can monitor supplier operations and 
behaviour by keeping track of the documents or statistical process control data of each 
manufacturing task, which is one aspect of FC (Lyles et al. 2008). The process of ‘keep on 
tracking’ is part of the effort to achieve high measurability.  
The success of task programmability and output measurability requires an unambiguous 
ultimate target. For example, buyer and supplier need to have common objectives (for 
example, improving quality, mitigating risk) while jointly developing the programmable 
tasks in the manufacturing process. However, some inter-firm coordination activities 
carried out under SD are difficult to program and measure. The target levels of quality 
improvement and risk mitigation are ambiguous, so that it is hard to determine 
measurement output. Also, the group may lack knowledge of this transformation process 
(i.e. task programmability) of risk mitigation (Das and Teng 2001). For instance, how can 
we program the task to reduce the potential quality risk in the purchased product? As the 
potential quality risk cannot be easily identified and quantified, it is difficult to develop a 
step-by-step process to reduce risk. Consequently, the SC mechanism is needed to govern 
the values, beliefs, and goals of SD actions.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 5. FC has a positive effect on SD.  
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Hypothesis 6. SC has a positive effect on SD. 
In PPR, a template of activities is developed which details the appropriate managerial 
actions to follow when a product recall is needed. This template is an effort towards task 
programmability, whereby each key action is followed and monitored to prevent the spread 
of problematic products through the downstream supply chain. Product recall is a high 
measurability practice, because managers can easily count the number of defective 
products that are recalled from the customer. Hence, the FC mechanism can ensure that 
supply chain partners will appropriately handle each of the recall processes (Dawar and 
Pillutla 2000).  
However, PPR also has ambiguous objectives that are difficult to program and measure. 
For instance, managers in the alliance may ask to what extent they should recall the 
problematic product from the downstream supply chain.  Where there is only a limited 
quality threat (i.e. no danger of harm to customers’ health), the firm may not advise 
consumers to return the product. Instead, managers may consider withdrawing the 
defective products from their downstream buyer companies (BRC, 2007). Moreover, the 
downstream partners might choose not to recall the product, as it will not cause an 
emergency. In this situation, PPR has relatively low programmability and measurability, 
as the tasks and objectives cannot be precisely programmed and measured (Das and Teng, 
2001). Thus, the SC mechanism is useful to control the behaviours of downstream partners, 
as the existence of common beliefs and goals of product recall management can motivate 
the partner firms to perform well in the inter-firm product recall activities. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 7. FC has a positive effect on PPR.  
Hypothesis 8. SC has a positive effect on PPR. 
2.2.2 The moderating roles of control mechanisms 
Since PPR involves activities that require close collaboration in the supply chain network, 
companies need to establish the most appropriate ways to enhance such collaboration. 
Clearly, the control mechanisms are useful for sustaining inter-organisational cooperation 
(Li et al. 2010b), so as to strengthen the impact of PPR on the firm’s performance. For 
example, supply chain partners need to comply with the pre-set rules or agreements so as 
to identify potential problems in the components and operate the remedy practices 
effectively, thus minimising the negative financial impact. In other words, FC helps focal 
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firms to enhance the positive impact of PPR on both quality and financial performance. 
Also, the adoption of control mechanisms can directly influence transaction costs, 
operational costs, and the willingness to engage in the risk management activities (Das and 
Teng 2001; Li et al. 2008). A firm with better SC mechanisms might be more motivated to 
implement, and exert more effort in leveraging, PPR to mitigate the quality risk and 
improve performance. In particular, PPR requires a high level of robustness, such as rapid 
response, accurate tracing of the source of problems and comprehensive review (Berman 
1999). If supply chain partners face the challenges in product recall without the same goal 
or shared norms, they might lack the willingness to operate the PPR activities in a timely 
manner, which could result in inefficiency in tracing the source of problems or cause delay 
to the product withdrawal process. As a result, there might be a greater loss for the focal 
company during a product recall. Therefore, control mechanisms could be seen as the 
activator of PPR for focal firms to enhance their performance: 
Hypothesis 9: FC strengthens the impacts of PPR on (a) QP; (b) FP. 
Hypothesis 10: SC strengthens the impacts of PPR on (a) QP; (b) FP. 
The main objective of SD is to improve supplier performance (Carr and Kaynak 2007) so 
as to enhance the buyer’s product quality and FP. However, implementing SD does not 
guarantee better performance, due to the existence of various pitfalls regarding lack of trust 
and supplier commitment (Handfield et al. 2009). Control mechanisms, which focus on 
governing the inter-organisational relationship (Li et al. 2008), enable firms to avoid these 
pitfalls when implementing SD. According to Handfield et al. (2009), before implementing 
SD the buyer company should explain clearly the potential benefits, to avoid the lack of 
supplier commitment. Praxmarer-Carus et al. (2013) indicate that the supplier’s perceived 
distribute fairness is a critical predictor of supplier’s satisfaction with SD program. If the 
buyer fails to convince the supplier that SD is profitable, the supplier may not be fully 
committed to the effort of implementing SD (Handfield et al. 2009).  In such a case, SC 
mechanisms could enhance the supplier’s acknowledgement of the benefits in SD. Because 
fulfilment of promises is one of the most important forms of SC (Fryxell et al. 2002; Luo 
2002), when SC is high, suppliers perceive that the benefits of SD delineated by the buyers 
are more reliable. Moreover, the use of SC can create informal pressures to sustain the 
supply chain cooperation (Kaufmann and Carter 2006). Such informal pressures can also 
help to urge the suppliers to share the financial return or benefits from SD. In other words, 
the SC mechanism ensures the buyers will obtain the expected returns of SD. On the other 
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hand, the use of FC can exert formal pressure on the supplier, such as through establishing 
an agreement to share benefits before implementing SD. For example, VarityPerkins2 will 
not run an SD program until their supplier formally agrees to benefits sharing (Handfield 
et al. 2009). Moreover, the use of FC makes it easier for the buyers to clarify the goals and 
responsibilities of each party at every stage of the SD. Hence, the SD implementation could 
be more focused and deliverable, as explicit contract details make the efforts and the 
outcome of SD more measurable. Above all, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 11: FC strengthens the impacts of SD on (a) QP; (b) FP. 
Hypothesis 12: SC strengthens the impacts of SD on (a) QP; (b) FP. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Measurements 
In order to establish an appropriate measurement instrument, we undertook a thorough 
literature review to identify and modify the scales used in previous research. Additionally, 
some question items were newly created based on the literature review and the related 
theoretical foundations presented in the previous section (i.e. PPR). The questionnaire 
items (see Appendix) were reviewed by three academics and three practitioners to ensure 
content validity. A seven-point Likert scale was adopted to indicate the extent to which 
respondents agree or disagree with each question item, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 
= strongly agree.  
Since our target respondents were directors and managers in China, the questionnaire was 
translated into Chinese. We consulted a leading scholar in China and Hong Kong to ensure 
the measurement items in Chinese reflected the business environment faced by the Chinese 
manufacturing industry. Following the procedure proposed by Brislin (1980), the Chinese 
questionnaire was subsequently translated back into English by a third party translator to 
ensure that the measurement items accurately reflect the original meanings. 
 
                                                 
2
 VarityPerkins, established in 1932, is a producer of diesel engines used in automotive and construction 
vehicles. 
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4.2 Data collection 
The unit of analysis of this study focuses on the relationships among business partners in 
a supply chain. The target respondents were directors or senior managers in manufacturing 
firms. Data were collected through a survey of Hong Kong manufacturing firms, all of 
which have their plants in the China Pearl River Delta (PRD) region. This research focuses 
on China because it is one of the most largest economies and has turned to be the 
manufacturing centre of the world (Deloitte 2016). Most importantly, in recent years, the 
Chinese manufacturers have been extensively involved in various product recall incidents. 
Moreover, the increased product harm incidents in China also present an imminent need to 
identify the efficient management practices that help to improve quality performance (Roth 
et al. 2008; Tse and Tan 2012). Given the above reasons, our proposed model is tested and 
validated by a sample of Chinese manufacturing companies. 
A merged contact list containing contact information of 4505 firms dealing in apparel, 
furniture, plastics, metals, computer equipment, electronics, measuring instruments and 
miscellaneous manufacturing in Hong Kong and the PRD region was used in this research. 
Potential informants were contacted three times via email; these communications included 
a pre-notice and an initial invitation letter along with a link to the survey. Because the 
Institute for Supply Management, Pearl River Delta (ISM-PRD) has endorsed this research, 
the invitation email included the ISM-PRD endorsement letter. The survey questionnaires 
were sent via email, and then after 12 weeks a follow-up email/call was sent to remind the 
managers to respond (i.e. second round). In total 289 survey questionnaires were received, 
representing a 6.4% response rate. Of these, 209 were usable. Table 1 shows the 
information of the respondents. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
We evaluated non-response bias by assessing differences between the respondents and non-
respondents. According to the procedure suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977), 
researchers can conduct the X2 tests to show that respondent and non-respondent firms 
share the same distribution of organisational size and annual sales at p<0.05. We compared 
the samples received in the first round (n=138) with those received in the second round 
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(n=71).  The result of the X2 tests indicates that there are no statistical differences at p<0.05 
when comparing organisational size (p=0.713) and annual sales (p=0.411) between early 
respondents and late respondents. Therefore, the results suggest that non-response bias is 
not a critical problem.  
The common method bias (CMB) may exist, as all the measures use seven-point Likert 
scales and responses are from a single informant from each organisation (Podsakoff et al. 
2003; Mura et al. 2012). To check for this, Harman’s single factor test is employed 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). The result of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) shows that six 
distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than one explain 69.116% of the total variance. 
However, the first factor in the EFA accounts for only 13.099%, which is not the majority 
of the total variance. Moreover, using AMOS 22, we apply confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) to conduct Harman’s single factor test again. The model fit indices of the single 
factor model (X2/df = 5.898, NNFI = 0.455, CFI = 0.499, and RMSEA = 0.153) are much 
worse than the suggested values (O'Leary-Kelly and Vokurka 1998), which indicates that 
CMB is not a threat to this research. 
 
4.3 Measurement assessment 
To check the convergent validity, we conduct CFA by correlating all the constructs. 
Applying CFA before testing the structural model is consistent with the two-step procedure 
suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). First, the measurement model shows a good 
model fit: comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.917, X2/df is less than 5 (1.91), root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA) is less than 0.08 (0.066). The non-normed fit index 
(NNFI) of 0.904, the incremental fit index (IFI) of 0.918 and goodness-fit-index (GFI) of 
0.847 further confirm that the measurement model is acceptable. Moreover, as shown in 
Table 2, the standardised coefficients, which range from 0.577 to 0.91, and the significant 
t-value (p<0.01) exceed the required cut-off values of 0.5 and 2 respectively (O'Leary-
Kelly and Vokurka 1998). An average variance extracted (AVE) of 0.50 or higher is 
usually suggested in the literature (Chin 1998); as shown in Table 2, the AVE values range 
from 0.522 to 0.732. The composite reliability and Cronbach’s alpha are all above 0.766 
and 0.764 respectively. Therefore, we can claim that the reliability of each construct is 
acceptable. 
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Insert Table 3 here. 
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The AVE comparison method is adopted to assess discriminant validity (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981). If the square root values of AVE for both the constructs that make up the 
pair are higher than the inter-correlation between any two constructs in the model, then the 
latent construct explains its assigned item that it shares with other constructs (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981). Table 3 shows that the square roots of AVE (bold numbers in diagonal) are 
greater than the correlations among the constructs (off-diagonal values). The result 
provides evidence of good discriminant validity. 
 
5. Data Analysis 
In this section, we use the structural equations modelling (SEM) method to test all the direct 
relationships in the baseline model (i.e. H1 – H8), and adopt the hierarchical regression 
method to obtain the moderation results (i.e. H9 – H12).  
 
5.1 Structural model 
……………………………………………………………….. 
Insert Figure 3 here. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
Figure 3 shows the overall results for the structural model. There is a good model fit, with 
acceptable values - X2/df = 2.033; CFI = 0.904; RMSEA = 0.070; GFI = 0.836; IFI = 0.905; 
NNFI = 0.891. Specifically, the structural path between SD and QP is positive and 
17 
 
significant (0.160, p<0.05). Thus, a high level of SD is seen to result in a high level of QP, 
lending support to H1. Likewise, the path coefficient from SD to FP is also significant 
(0.318; p<0.001), supporting the notion that SD has a positive impact on the firm’s FP. 
Hence, H2 is supported. As the relationship between PPR and QP is positive and significant 
(0.347, p<0.001), H3 is confirmed. The significant path coefficient (0.309, p<0.001) 
supports the claim that PPR has positive and direct effect on FP. Therefore, H4 is accepted. 
Moreover, for the relationship between the risk management practices and control 
mechanisms, all four hypotheses (H5-H8) are approved. The structural path between FC 
and SD is positive and significant (0.353, p <0.001), as is the relationship between FC and 
PPR (0.316, p <0.001). Likewise, the positive effect of SC on SD is also significant (0.332, 
p <0.001). Finally, the impact of SC on PPR is positively significant (0.463; p<0.001). 
We also test the effects of three control variables (i.e. Industry Category, Firm Size and 
Technology Level) on the two performance constructs. The path coefficients for the control 
variables on FP and QP are all insignificant. The values for the standardised path 
coefficient from Firm Size, Industry Category and Technology Level to QP are -0.003, 
0.097, and 0.047, and to FP are 0.076, -0.029, and 0.071 respectively. The insignificant 
path coefficients imply that these factors do not influence the relationships in the proposed 
model.  
 
5.2 Moderation analysis 
To test the moderating effects we use multiple linear regression with the hierarchical 
procedure. In step one of the regression, we analyse the control variable (Firm Size) as the 
independent variable. Then, the variables of risk management practices and control 
mechanisms are entered in step two and step three respectively. In step four, we examine 
the interaction terms. To reduce multicollinearity, we transform each construct to mean-
centred before producing the interaction terms (Liu 2015). The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) scores in our models are all below the cut-off value of 10 (O'Brien 2007). Hence, 
multicollinearity is not a serious issue for the analysis. As shown in Table 4 (Dependent 
Variable: QP) and Table 5 (Dependent Variable: FP), the effects of the control variable are 
insignificant. Moreover, in step two of both regression models, our results are similar to 
those from our structural model (Figure 3). Both SD and PPR have significant and positive 
effect on both FP and QP.  
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This research finds that the two types of control mechanism have different moderation 
effects in the relationships between risk management practices and performance. In the 
models for QP, the interaction between FC and PPR is positive and significant (β=0.149), 
which supports H9a. Hence, FC strengthens the effect of PPR on QP. FC also positively 
moderates the relationship between PPR and FP (β=0.119). Therefore, H9b is confirmed. 
With regard to SD, we find that only SC has a significant moderating effect on its impact 
on the FP (β=0.120), so H12b is supported. Following the procedure of Aiken and West 
(1991), Figures 4 to 6 present the results of simple slope tests. To illustrate the moderation 
effect, both moderators were assigned the value of one standard deviation above and below 
their means. Although the effects of PPR are significant at both high and low level of FC, 
PPR is more efficient when the company has higher FC (for QP: β=0.1377 with low level 
of FC and β=0.2858 with high level of FC; for FP: β=0.1891 with low level of FC and 
β=0.4255 with high level of FC). Likewise, the relationships between SD and FP are 
significant at both high and low SC levels (β=0.1466 with low level of SC and β=0.3440 
with high level of SC). However, SD is more effective under high SC than under low SC, 
when it is influencing FP. In summary, based on the simple slope analysis, the results 
obtained from regression analysis are further supported. 
 
19 
 
……………………………………………………………….. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
Insert Table 5 here. 
……………………………………………………………….. 
 
6. Discussion 
Our results contribute to the risk management literature by showing that both PPR and SD 
are strong determinants of both QP and FP. Our analysis is consistent with the view in the 
SD literature that inter-firm cooperation in investigating and solving quality problems can 
improve FP (Carr and Kaynak 2007). The SD approach can benefit both buyer and supplier 
firms regarding quality and cost if there is a formalised procedure of profit sharing for both 
firms. Moreover, the results of this research are consistent with those of Zirpoli and Caputo 
(2002), who found that both buyer and supplier firms take notice of suggested ways to 
improve the component or cut the cost during production through SD.       
Triggering a PPR in response to a product flaw can mitigate the warranty cost and provide 
an excellent customer relationship in the long run. Moreover, our result suggests that PPR 
is a strong determinant of QP. Firms that are ready and willing proactively to withdraw any 
defective product will be more aware of the quality issues of each component of their 
products (Kaynak 2003), and high awareness of the potential threat of recall will facilitate 
the identification of vulnerabilities in their products and operation. As a result, these firms 
can design a product recall simulation exercise for their more vulnerable items, and will be 
more likely to investigate the potential root causes of any defect. It should be noted that 
the relationship between PPR and QP is stronger than the relationship between SD and QP. 
Furthermore, our result shows that the PPR also significantly influences the FP, which 
suggests that the operation of PPR is positively related to the long-term profit of the 
company.  
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Fiol and Lyles (1985) state that different types of operations comprise different types of 
information, so the types of control mechanism adopted to manage those operations will 
vary. Further, the moderating effects of each control mechanism vary across the 
relationships between PPR and firm’s performance. FC, rather than SC, amplifies the 
effects of PPR on both QP and FP. As product recall is a complex operation, focusing on 
establishing formal and comprehensive agreements could help the company to control 
systematically the uncertainties it creates. Proper FC is important to ensure the on-time 
adoption of PPR, since delayed action may result in worse firm performance in a product 
recall. In the context of emerging markets such as China, substantial literature demonstrates 
the critical role of SC mechanisms (Li et al. 2010b). However, the results obtained from 
the moderating analysis indicate that Chinese companies may require FC mechanisms 
when they plan the PPR to improve business performance. Although Li et al. (2010b) argue 
that Chinese managers may regard FC mechanisms as a signal of distrust in IORs, they 
should be an effective means to clarify responsibilities in a product recall. Extending the 
research of Li et al. (2010b), our research finds that FC is a unique factor that amplifies the 
effects of PPR on QP and FP. 
Surprisingly, we find that neither control mechanism strengthens the effect of SD on QP. 
However, the insignificant moderating effects of control mechanisms highlight the 
fundamental role of SD in a firm’s QP. Despite different control mechanisms, SD 
essentially impact on buyer firm’s QP. Moreover, this research finds that the SC positively 
moderates the relationship between SD and FP. However, the moderating effect of FC is 
not significant in this relationship. The significant moderating effect of social control is 
consistent with Blonska et al. (2013), who demonstrate the relational capital can strengthen 
the efficiency of the SD that overcome the pitfalls of supplier development by encouraging 
benefits sharing. This finding provides further support for Lee and Humphreys (2007) 
argument, which emphasises the strong link between Guanxi and SD. In China, where 
IORs are characterised by greater SC, there is an expectation that favours will be exchanged 
and repaid in the long run. SD activities, such as training, technology education, and even 
direct investment, can be seen as a form of favour given by the buyers (Cheng et al. 2012). 
Under strong SC, the favours received from the activities of SD should place more pressure 
on suppliers to offer on-time delivery service and continuous supply of required materials 
or components (Cheng et al. 2012).  
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This study contributes both theoretically and practically to the field of SCRM. The previous 
literature in SCRM focuses either on the antecedents which foster the implementation of 
SCRM (Grötsch et al. 2013) and on the relationship between SCRM practices and firm 
performances (Wiengarten et al. 2010). From the perspective of agency theory, we extend 
current literature by investigating a theoretical framework that includes both antecedents 
and performance outcomes of the SCRM practices. Second, although numerous studies 
have proposed various SCRM practises and strategies (Finch 2004; Norrman and Jansson 
2004; Tang 2006; Tummala and Schoenherr 2011), only a handful of them provide 
empirical evidences for the validation of these practices (Hendricks et al. 2009; Colicchia 
and Strozzi 2012; Fan et al. 2017). We respond to this call by empirically examining the 
operational consequence of both risk management practices (i.e. SD and PPR). Third, to 
the best of our knowledge, this research is the first attempt to study the direct effect and 
moderating effect of the control mechanisms on SCRM practices. The various roles of 
control mechanisms help resolve the question of whether either SC or FC impact directly 
on risk management practices, or whether the control mechanisms work together with 
appropriate risk management practices to improve firms’ performance. Although the 
antecedent roles of control mechanisms in risk management practices are highly significant, 
the results of moderating analysis reveal the effects of control mechanisms on risk 
management practices from a different perspective.  
We also provide several suggestions for industrial practitioners based on the research 
findings. First, manufacturing firms may wish to rethink their common practices used to 
deal with quality risk. This research shows that PPR can impact on QP, and the relationship 
between PPR and QP is even stronger than the relationship between SD and QP. Thus, 
firms should not only allocate resources to maintain SD activities and to avoid the 
possibility of defective products from the supplier production process. Rather, the research 
model suggests that firms should also be aware of the power of PPR, in which firms are 
willing to withdraw a potentially problematic product in advance before a product-harm 
crisis is sparked. Also, formal control and social control mechanisms can improve both risk 
management practices. Therefore, establishing explicit control rules and cultivating social 
norms among key supply chain partners can more effectively manage quality risk in the 
complex global supply chain environment. However, a critical implication for the 
practitioners is that the use of different control mechanisms might have a different effect 
in strengthening the relationship between the risk management practice and firm 
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performance. To achieve the optimal performance outcome, firms should build their SCRM 
strategies in accordance with the use of different control mechanisms. Specifically, it is 
beneficial for the company to adopt FC to strengthen the effect of PPR on both FP and QP. 
Managers should understand that the use of SC may not help to improve the effect of PPR 
on FP and QP. However, when implementing the SD to improve FP, firms should advocate 
SC in a buyer-supplier relationship.     
The two practices of supplier development and proactive product recall are found to 
influence the product quality. The results also show that the performance effect of risk 
absorption is positively related to the firm’s financial performance. Moreover, the agency 
theory can be selected as the primary theory to provide the dynamic view of inter-firm 
cooperation in risk management. The two forms of control mechanism are both found to 
positively influence the two types of risk management practices. However, the relationship 
between proactive product recall and financial performance is found to be insignificant. 
Additionally, the research finds that product quality is an important mediating variable in 
proactive product recall and firm’s financial performance. It is hoped that this study will 
spawn an interest in empirical study of supply chain quality risk management in future 
operations management research. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This research has proposed and tested two risk management practices, SD and PPR, and 
their relationships with product quality and financial performance. The two practices are 
found to influence the FP and QP. Agency theory can be selected as the primary theory to 
provide a dynamic view of inter-firm cooperation in risk management. The two forms of 
control mechanism, FC and SC, are both found to positively influence the two types of risk 
management practices. However, the moderating roles of control mechanisms are 
somewhat surprising. This research finds that only FC has a significant moderating effect 
on the relationship between PPR and both types of performance, while only SC 
significantly amplifies the effect of SC on FP. We suggest that given the product recall in 
China could be extremely complex and highly uncertain, companies should rely on the FC 
to clarify the responsibilities and control the uncertainty. Also, we suggest that with greater 
SC, companies could be guaranteed that they will be repaid for SD activities from the 
suppliers. Therefore, SC amplifies the effect of SD on the buyer’s business performance. 
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While this study makes a significant contribution to both academic theory and industrial 
practice, several limitations must be considered when interpreting the research findings. 
First, the research uses only a single key respondent from each firm to collect the data. The 
use of a single respondent to rate diverse SC-related question items may generate some 
inaccuracy and more than the usual amount of random error. Future research should seek 
to utilise multiple respondents in each participating organisation to improve the accuracy 
and to reduce the random error. 
Departing from the internal operational process as a core focus of the traditional view of 
SC risk management, this study focuses on inter-firm cooperation in risk management. 
Extending this study to other settings will be useful to allow comparison of significant 
findings across different contexts, for example, Sino-foreign alliances in SC risk 
management.  
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Appendix 
The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the 
below statements as applicable to their firm: (1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
Supplier Development 
SD1 We provide training for suppliers on quality requirements. (Krause 1999; 
Sanchez-Rodriguez et 
al. 2005; Carr and 
Kaynak 2007; Nagati 
and Rebolledo 2013) 
SD2 We set up tasks and procedures for supplier production with our key suppliers. 
SD3 We hold meetings with suppliers on a regular basis to solve quality problems. 
SD4 We invest in our key suppliers’ facilities to improve product quality. 
SD5 We require our key suppliers to return the documents or statistical process control (SPC) 
data so we can keep track of the production quality (e.g. error rate, defect rate, defect, 
SPC). 
Proactive product recall  
PPR1 We recall/withdraw products from our customers proactively if the products are defective. (Siomkos and 
Kurzbard 1994; 
Heerde et al. 2007) 
PPR2 If our product has a quality problem, we will unconditionally replace the defective product 
for our customers. 
PPR3 We investigate the cause of product recall/withdrawal in order to avoid it happening again. 
PPR4 Checklists are typically provided detailing the appropriate managerial actions to follow 
when we need to recall/withdraw a product. 
Formal Control 
FC1 Detailed contract is the most important way to guarantee cooperation success. (Li et al. 2008; Li et 
al. 2010b) 
FC2 Strict enforcement of detailed contract is essential for controlling the behaviours of all 
parties. 
FC3 All working rules specified in a detailed contract should be followed. 
FC4 All partners should respect all explicit procedures in a detailed contract. 
Social Control 
SC1 We rely on our partners to keep their promises. (Li et al. 2008; Li et 
al. 2010b) 
SC2 Our partners are always frank and truthful in their dealings with us. 
SC3 Without monitoring, the partners would fulfil their obligations. 
 
The respondents were asked to indicate the level of changes in their firm over the past three 
years (1= decreased significantly; 4= no change; 7= increased significantly) 
Quality Performance 
QP1 The warranty cost of our product1. (Koufteros et al. 2007) 
QP2 Our capability to offer a quality product that meets customer expectations. 
QP3 Our capability to offer a reliable product that meets customer needs. 
QP4 Our capability to offer a durable product that meets customer needs. 
QP5 Our capability to offer a high performance product that meets customer needs. 
Financial Performance 
FP1 Firm’s net income before tax. (Calantone et al. 2002; 
Merschmann and 
Thonemann 2011) 
FP2 Sales Growth. 
FP3 Return on investment. 
FP4 Overall profitability. 
Note: 1. Reverse coded 
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Tables 
Table 1. Profile of Firms 
Organisation annual revenue Percent 
<HK$10 million  22.5% 
HK$10 million-HK$50 million  43.5% 
HK$50 million-HK$200 million 25.8% 
>HK$200 million 8.2% 
SIC Industry description  
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 18.6% 
35 Industrial and commercial machinery and computer 
equipment 
21.5% 
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, 
except for computer equipment 
55.5% 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 4.4% 
Firm Size  
<=200 59.3% 
201-500 21.1% 
>1000 19.6% 
 
Table 2. Construct Loading and Reliability Index 
Construct Indicator Item 
Loadinga 
T-value* Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
SD SD1b 0.786 - 0.852 0.859 0.556 
 SD2 0.91 14.020    
 SD3 0.765 11.668    
 SD4 0.577 8.391    
 SD5 0.644 9.512    
PPR  PPR1b 0.87 - 0.839 0.842 0.575 
 PPR2 0.802 12.946    
 PPR3 0.671 10.354    
 PPR4 0.67 10.324    
FC FC3b 0.871 - 0.915 0.916 0.732 
 FC2 0.892 17.341    
 FC4 0.835 15.492    
 FC1 0.823 15.095    
SC SC3b 0.712 - 0.764 0.766 0.522 
 SC1 0.762 8.810    
 SC2 0.692 8.311    
QP QP1b 0. 637 - 0.85 0.852 0.538 
 QP2 0.842 9.522    
 QP3 0. 773 9.010    
 QP4 0.752 8.841    
 QP5 0.641 7.809    
FP FP1b 0.758 - 0.863 0.864 0.613 
 FP3 0.802 11.281    
 FP2 0.787 11.074    
 FP4 0.784 11.036    
Note: a. Item loading is also known as the standardised regression weight. b. Fixed parameters. * All item 
loading significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 3: Discriminant Validity – AVE comparison 
 PPR FC FC SD FP SC 
PPR 0.758      
FC 0.460 0.856     
QP 0.436 0.427 0.733    
SD 0.524 0.458 0.330 0.745   
FP 0.451 0.256 0.475 0.465 0.783  
SC 0.568 0.547 0.378 0.450 0.454 0.723 
Note: The diagonal elements are the square root of AVE 
 
 
Table 4. Hierarchical regression for Quality Performance 
Dependent Variable: Quality Performance 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3a Step 4a Step 3b Step 4b 
Control Variable 
Company Size -0.008 -0.051 -0.056 -0.053 -0.035 -0.034 
Main Effect   
SD  0.197*** 0.135* 0.122* 0.169** 0.167** 
PPR  0.267*** 0.196*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.236*** 
Moderator 
Formal Control (FC)   0.223*** 0.255***   
Social Control (SC)     0.138* 0.123 
Moderation Effect 
FC x SD    -0.090   
FC x RCR    0.149**   
SC x SD      0.050 
SC x RCR      0.007 
𝑅2 0.000 0.155 0.196 0.214 0.169 0.172 
F 0.013 18.677*** 10.428*** 2.337* 3.477** 0.297 
∆𝑅2  0.207 0.000 0.025 0.028 0.030 
F Change 0.646 26.712*** 0.048 3.344** 7.393*** 4.081** 
Max VIF    1.391  1.628 
Note: The significant parameter estimates are set in bold.  
* p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Table 5. Hierarchical regression for Financial Performance 
Dependent Variable: Financial Performance 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3a Step 4a Step 3b Step 4b 
Control Variable 
Company Size 0.056 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.021 0.019 
Main Effect   
SD  0.302*** 0.298*** 0.279*** 0.262*** 0.254*** 
PPR  0.236*** 0.232*** 0.246*** 0.163** 0.226*** 
Moderator 
Formal Control (FC)   0.016 0.060   
Social Control (SC)     0.193*** 0.132** 
Moderation Effect 
FC x SD    0.076   
FC x RCR    0.119*   
SC x SD      0.120* 
SC x RCR      0.091 
𝑅2 0.003 0.210 0.210 0.236 0.238 0.268 
F 0.646 18.077*** 13.506*** 10.327*** 15.831*** 12.235*** 
∆𝑅2  0.207 0.000 0.025 0.028 0.030 
F Change 0.646 26.712*** 0.048 3.344** 7.393*** 4.081** 
Max VIF    1.391  1.628 
Note: The significant parameter estimates are set in bold. 
* p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
 
 
Figure 2. SD and PPR adopted in firm’s supply chain 
 
H11 & H12 
H9 & H10 
H5, H6, 
H7, & H8 
H1, H2, 
H3, & H4 
Control Mechanism 
- Social Control 
- Formal Control 
Quality Risk Management 
- Proactive Product Recall 
- Supplier Development 
Firm Performance 
- Quality Performance 
- Financial Performance 
Direct Effect 
Moderating Effect 
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R2=0.23 
Formal 
Control 
Social 
Control 
Supplier 
Development  
Proactive 
Product Recall 
Quality 
Performance 
Financial 
Performance 
0.318 
(T=4.001) 
R2=0.31 
R2=0.18 
R2=0.25 
0.347 
(T=3.973) 
0.160 
(T=2.016) 
0.353 
(T=4.801) 
0.316 
(T=4.455) 
0.463 
(T=5.506) 
0.332 
(T=4.097) 
0.309 
(T=3.861) 
Note: 1. Numbers show above the arrow represent the standardised regression weight. 2. All structural paths are significant at 0.05 
level 
 Figure 3. Structural Model 
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Figure 6. Moderating effect of SC on relationship 
between SD and FP 
Figure 5. Moderating effect of FC on relationship 
between RCR and QP 
Figure 4. Moderating effect of FC on relationship 
between RCR and FP 
